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Trading Liability Under SEC Rule 10b-5:
A Commentary
ROBERT N. RAPP*
Adopted in 1942 pursuant to the authority prescribed in section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,1 SEC rule lOb-52 affords
protection to buyers and sellers of securities against fraudulent prac-
tices. Since the existence of an implied private right of action under
the rule for defrauded purchasers and sellers was recognized three
decades ago,3 the provision, which one distinguished court of appeals
has referred to as being "plain, concise and unambiguous, " 4 has
surely become the most litigated provision among all of the federal
securities laws. It has commanded the energies and creative talents of
lawyers, jurists, and legal scholars to a degree not experienced else-
where in the law.
The development of the body of federal law under rule 10b-5 has
branched in many directions, touching a wide-ranging gamut of abu-
sive practices in the corporate and securities milieu. Expansionist
applications of rule lOb-5, however, have not come without criticism,
and in recent important determinations the omnidirectional tentacles
of the rule have experienced no small amount of trimming. 5 In
Fridrich v. Bradford6 the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit imposed a further restriction on the scope of rule lOb-5 liability,
this time in the familiar area of "insider trading." In so doing, the
* Member, Ohio Bar. Mr. Rapp is associated with the firm of Calfee, Halter & Griswold,
Cleveland, Ohio.
1. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970) [hereinafter cited as the Exchange Act].
2. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1976):
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national
security exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud;
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the pur-
chase or sale of any security.
3. See Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). For general
consideration and discussion of the bases for implication of private rights of action under pro-
visions of the federal securities laws, see Rapp, An Implied Private Right of Action under
Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 1972 SEc. L. REV. 159.
4. Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir. 1971).
5. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (reaffirmation
of the strict purchaser-seller rule for standing under rule l0b-5); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
425 U.S. 185, (1976) (high degree of scienter required under rule lOb-5).
6. 542 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S.CL 767 (1977).
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court has confronted head-on the established notions of rule lOb-5
liability in the open-market setting which have their roots in the land-
mark SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.' litigation, as applied to a
private action for damages in Shapiro v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fen-
ner & Smith, Inc.8
Fridrich held that no private action for damages under rule lOb-5
will lie in favor of open-market purchasers or sellers of securities
against those persons having material inside information who trans-
act in those securities without disclosing that information to the
marketplace, unless the plaintiff can demonstrate a direct causal re-
lationship or connection between the insider's trading and the injury
suffered.9  The holding of the court is in direct conflict with the
earlier Second Circuit position in Shapiro that liability for damages
under rule lOb-5 will be imposed upon one who, without disclosing
inside information, buys or sells securities in the open market-that
liability running to all persons who during the same period purchased
or sold the securities in the open market without knowledge of the in-
side information.
The decision in Fridrich has far-reaching implications, not only
from the precise holding, but also from the reasoning that the court
employed to reach it. In addition to directly attacking the correctness
of the Second Circuit position in Shapiro, the court focused not only
on the important substantive question under rule 1Ob-5 of what ele-
ment of "causation" will be required to impose civil liability for
damages, but also upon important and heretofore untouched policy
considerations concerning the place of the private right of action
under rule lOb-5 in the entire federal securities regulatory scheme.
In all of these respects it is a case of extraordinary significance in
its approach and result.
This article will analyze and comment on the Sixth Circuit pro-
nouncement in Fridrich and its implications. Necessary to an effec-
tive consideration and understanding of the case and the situation
that it creates, however, is some reflection on the legal environment
in which it was decided. Thus, section I below focuses upon the de-
velopment of the scope of rule tOb-5 liability for "insider trading"
from Texas Gulf Sulphur to Shapiro, and in that light discussion of
Fridrich follows in section II. Section III will critically analyze
Fridrich, and section IV will develop what is submitted to be the
proper approach to liability for damages under rule lOb-5 for insider
trading violations.
7. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
8. 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974).
9. 542 F.2d at 318-19.
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I. INSIDER TRADING LIABILITY FROM Texas Gulf Sulphur TO
Shapiro: BREACH OF DUTY AND CAUSATION IN FACT
A. The Developing Principles
To the extent that one might suggest a notion as being axiomatic
under rule lOb-5, it would have to be that the purpose of the rule is
to prevent inequitable practices and to insure fairness in securities
transactions, whether conducted face to face, over the counter, or on a
national exchange. 10 Through the operation of the rule investors may
have the justifiable expectation that they will all have equal access to
all material information in their transactions. This principle was
expressed by Judge Waterman in the landmark decision in Texas Gulf
Sulphur as follows:
The essence of the Rule is that anyone who, trading for his own account
in the securities of a corporation has 'access, directly or indirectly, to in-
formation intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not
for the personal benefit of anyone' may not take 'advantage of such
information knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing,'
i.e., the investing public. . . .Insiders, as directors or management
officers are, of course, by this Rule precluded from so unfairly dealing,
but the Rule is also applicable to one possessing the information who
may not be strictly termed an 'insider' within the meaning of Sec. 16(b)
of the Act. . . .Thus, anyone in possession of material inside informa-
tion must either disclose it to the investing public, or, if he is disabled
from disclosing it in order to protect a corporate confidence, or he
chooses not to do so, must abstain from trading in or recommending
the securities concerned while such inside information remains undis-
closed."
Texas Gulf Sulphur involved, among other things, the "tipping"
of material inside information, and subsequent trading on that inside
information by the people so tipped, prior to disclosure to the market-
place as a whole.' 2  In holding that, in an injunctive action by the
10. Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, under which rule lob-5 was promulgated, applies
to "any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered."
and thus on its face is all inclusive. Significantly, the landmark case of Kardon v. National
Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946), in which a private right of action under rule
106-5 was first implied, arose in the context of a transaction among only four individuals in
shares of a closely held corporation. Early suggestions that section 10(b) and rule l0b-5 ought
to be limited only to trading in the organized markets were uniformly rejected by the courts.
See, e.g., Northern Trust Co. v. Essaness Theatres Corp., 103 F. Supp. 954 (N.D. Ill. 1952);
Robinson v. Difford, 92 F. Supp. 145 (E.D. Pa. 1950).
I1. 401 F.2d at 848 (citations omitted).
12. The case actually had two principal aspects. The first involved insider trading and the
"tipping" of inside information concerning the impressive results of certain exploratory drilling
by the company. The focus there was on the liability of those insiders who tipped the informa-
tion as well as those who had traded on the basis of it. The other, and perhaps even more
familiar aspect of the case, centered on the public dissemination by the corporation of mis-
leading information concerning drilling progress. The principal issue there was %hether or
not the corporation could be held to have violated rule lOb-5 by issuing a misleading press
release in the absence of any trading by it, i.e., whether the violation occured "in con-
nection with" the purchase or sale of a security. See note 16 infra.
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SEC, an insider-"tipper" is liable under rule lOb-5 for the profitable
trading in securities by his "tippees," the court gave rise to the now
familiar "disclose or abstain" rule, which requires, under penalty of a
rule lOb-5 violation, that one in possession of material, undisclosed
information either publicly disclose it or refrain from buying or sell-
ing the security. The duty that this "rule" creates runs in favor of
the person with whom the insider is dealing, which, in the open-
market setting, as the court points out in the passage quoted above,
means the investing public. By designating an entire market, and all
of those buying and selling in it at the time, as victims of the insider
trading-or more precisely of the informational imbalance that it
presupposes-the court protects the integrity of securities markets by
assuring that all participants have equal access to material informa-
tion. 3
But Texas Gulf Sulphur did no more than establish the operative
principle for insider trading liability. Since it was an injunctive
action brought by the SEC, it did not decide whether an insider
trading violation could render the insider liable in a civil action for
damages, and if so, the extent of that liability. Early cases before
Texas Gulf Sulphur, such as Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio & Television
Corp.,14 had required something analogous to contractual privity be-
tween plaintiff and defendant to establish liability for damages under
rule 1Ob-5. In Joseph, plaintiffs had purchased over an exchange
shares of a corporation that was, unknown to them, in serious financial
condition. Defendants were directors and officers of the corporation
who had unloaded their shares onto the market without disclosing the
true condition of the company to the market, during a period ending
13. Speaking for the court, Judge Waterman addressed the point as follows:
The core of Rule l0b-5 is the implementation of the Congressional purpose that
all investors should have equal access to the rewards of participation in securities
transactions. It was the intent of Congress that all member, of the investing public
should be subject to identical market risks,-which market risks include, of course the
risk that one's evaluative capacity or one's capital available to put at risk may exceed
another's capacity or capital. The insiders here were not trading on an equal looting
with the outside investors. They alone were in a position to evaluate the probability
and magnitude of what seemed from the outset to be a major ore strike: they alone
could invest safely, secure in the expectation that the price of TGS stock would rise
substantially in the event such a major strike should materialize. but would decline
little, if at all, in the event of failure, for the public, ignorant at the outset of the
favorable probabilities would likewise be unaware of the unproductive exploration.
and the additional exploration costs would not significantly affect TGS market prices,
Such inequities based upon unequal access to knowledge should not be shrugged o1
as inevitable in our way of life, or, in view of the congressional concern in the area.
remain uncorrected.
401 F.2d at 851-52.
Well before the Second Circuit's analysis in Texas Gulf Sulphur, the SEC had expresscd its
similar view that the status of a corporate insider carries with it fiduciary responsibilities to
the trading markets and those outsiders participating in them. See In re Cady, Roberts & Co,
40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
14. 99 F. Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), affd per curiam, 198 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1952),
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before plaintiffs had purchased their shares. To the plaintiffs' conten-
tion that defendants were liable for failure to disclose, the district
court responded:
Nothing in the history of the Act or the Rule permits the far-reaching
effect sought herein by plaintiffs. A semblance of privity between the
vendor and purchaser of the security in connection with which the im-
proper act, practice or course of business was invoked seems to be
requisite and it is entirely lacking here.' 5
This restrictive notion of privity as an element of 1Ob-5 liability
was discarded by subsequent decisions, commencing with Texas Guff
Sulphur. In an aspect of the case not involving insider trading the
SEC alleged that the corporate defendant had violated rule lOb-5 by
disseminating false or misleading information to the public. In de-
fense, the corporation alleged that the violation charged did not occur
"in connection with the purchase or sale" of securities as required by
the Rule.' 6 Thus, the court was called upon to interpret the meaning of
the "in connection with" requirement as it relates to the impersonal
open-market setting. Judge Waterman declared:
The dominant congressional purposes underlying the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 were to promote free and open public securities
markets and to protect the investing public from suffering inequities in
trading, including, specifically, inequities that follow from trading that
has been stimulated by the publication of false or misleading corporate
information releases.
Therefore it seems clear from the legislative purpose Congress ex-
pressed in the Act, and the legislative history of Section 10(b) that
Congress when it used the phrase 'in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security' intended only that the device employed, whatever
it might be, be- of a sort that would cause reasonable investors to rely
thereon, and, in connection therewith, so relying, cause them to purchase
or sell a corporation's securities.
...Accordingly, we hold that Rule lOb-5 is violated whenever
assertions are made, as here, in a manner reasonably calculated to in-
15. 99 F. Supp. at 706. The decision was affirmed by a divided court on the basis of the
district judge's reasoning and the intervening decision by the Second Circuit in Birnbaum %.
Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952). Birnbaum, of course. established the
fundamental standing rule for actions under rule lOb-5-that a lOb-5 plaintiff be an actual
purchaser or seller of a security-which was recently affirmed by the Supreme Court in Blue
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
Judge Frank rendered a strong dissent in Joseph based upon his lies' that common lan
limitations, including strict privity, were not intended to be applied under section 10(b) and
rule lOb-5.
16. The rule proscribes fraudulent or deceptive practices that occur "in connection ssith-
the purchase or sale of a security. Texas Gulf Sulphur represented the first real considera-
tion of the meaning of the "in connection with" language in the rule, and represented a prime
tituation in which to analyze it in the open-market situation. The logical inquiry focused on the
extent to which the making of a false or misleading statement for public dissemination could
subject the corporation to liability in the absence of any trading on its part.
19771
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fluence the investing public . .. if such assertions are false or mislead-
ing or are so incomplete as to mislead irrespective of whether the
issuance of the release was motivated by corporate officials for ulterior
purposes.'
7
Thus, the court looked to the impact of a lOb-5 proscribed act on a
generalized market and those members of the investing public who
suffer from that act "in connection with" their trading in that market.
This is the root of the so-called "fraud on the market" theory of lOb-5
liability that achieved considerable prominence following Texas Gtlf
Sulphur.'8
In Heit v. Weitzen, t 9 decided by the same court just a short time
later, a class action was brought on behalf of purchasers of securities
of Belock Instrument Corporation who alleged, inter alia, that the
corporation had failed to disclose material facts regarding income in
its annual report, press releases, and SEC filings. Plaintiffs alleged
that they had purchased their securities in the open market at prices
that they contended were artificially inflated by reason of the false or
misleading information that had been disseminated by the company.
None of the defendants in the case had purchased or sold securities
themselves, and the district court had granted their motion to dismiss
upon grounds that the "in connection with" element of rule 1Ob-5
could not be satisfied. In light of Texas Gulf Sulphur, however, the
Second Circuit reversed. Now confronted with a damage action coun-
terpart to Texas Gulf Sulphur, Judge Medina observed:
Judge Waterman writing for the court in Texas Gulf Sulphur con-
strued the 'in connection with' requirement broadly and held that the
clause was satisfied whenever a device was employed 'of a sort that
would cause reasonable investors to rely thereon, and, in connection
therewith, so relying, cause them to purchase or sell a corporation's
securities,' SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., at 860. There is no neces-
sity for contemporaneous trading in securities by insiders or by the cor-
poration itself. 'Rule lOb-5 is violated whenever assertions are made
... in a manner reasonably calculated to influence the investing
public, e.g., by means of the financial media . . . . if such assertions
are false or misleading or are so incomplete as to mislead irrespective of
whether the issuance of the release was motivated by corporate officials
for ulterior purposes.' SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., at 861.
Applying this rule, and accepting at face value plaintiffs' well
pleaded allegations, as we must on a motion to dismiss for failure to
17. 401 F.2d at 858-862.
18. The Texas Gulf Sulphur concept of "connection" was further developed in later Cases,
including Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., in which the Supreme Court,
although speaking in a non-open-market setting, declared that the -.uffering of an injiury by an
investor as a result of deceptive practices "touching" the transaction would satisfy the "in
connection with" requirement. 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971); see also Leawco Data Processing Equip-
ment Corp. v. Maxwell [1973-1974 Transfer Binder) FED. SEc. L REP. (CCH) 94,403, at
95,377-79 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
19. 402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968).
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state a claim, we conclude that plaintiffs have met the requirements of
the 'in connection with' clause. It is reasonable to assume that in-
vestors may very well rely on the material contained in false corporate
financial statements which have been disseminated in the market place,
and in so relying may subsequently purchase securities of the corpora-
tion. The 'ulterior motive' present in the instant case-the concealment
of the fraud from the government-is irrelevant, since the false informa-
tion was circulated to a large segment of the investing public. It is
impossible to isolate the particular 'fraudulent' acts and consider them
as directed toward the government alone. 0
Thus, the court found sufficient "connection" to withstand a motion to
dismiss.
21
Although neither Texas Gulf Sulphur nor Heit v. Weitzen ad-
dressed the issue of the scope of rule lOb-5 liability for damages of
those who trade on inside information to a class of open market
purchasers and sellers,22 taken together they establish that a rule lOb-5
violation may relate to an entire marketplace and affect all purchases
and sales in that marketplace. They found sufficient "connection" to
exist between such a violative act and the transactions of market
traders to give rise to a right of recovery by open-market buyers
and sellers. Most importantly, the cases made it clear that in the
open-market setting contractual privity is not an element of a rule lOb-5
action in determining who is protected by the rule, and thus who is
able to sue for recovery in the face of its violation. This represented
a departure from the restrictive tone that had been set in the early
1950's in Joseph, which had required a "semblance of privity" as an
element of an action based on a failure to disclose. As stated by
the Tenth Circuit in Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, "the common
law requirement of privity has all but vanished from lOb-5 proceed-
ings. 23  Yet it is interesting to note that in Fridrich v. Bradford the
Sixth Circuit reached back to Joseph to support its rejection of the
Shapiro insider-trading rule.
This is not to imply that Texas Gulf Sulphur, as applied in private
20. Id. at 913.
21. The same result obtained in Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.
1971), in which the Tenth Circuit evaluated the SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. and keit %,.
Wejtzen view of requisite "connection" as the "forward looking view." The court further ob-
served that "[p]erhaps the first step is to realize that the common law requirement of privity has
all but vanished from lOb-5 proceedings while the distinguishable 'connection' element is re-
tained." 446 F.2d at 101.
22. The Texas Gulf Sulphur/Heit v. Weitzen approach to lOb-5 open-market liability en-
gendered serious inquiry into the limitation on the extent of an inside trader's liability for
damages. For example, in the district court opinion in Financial Indus. Fund v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp., [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 93,004 at 90.702 (D.
Colo. 1971), rev'd, 474 F.2d 514 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973). the court ob-
served: "We are a long way from holding that the TGS official who used inside information to buy
600 shares the day that 440,000 traded is liable to all the sellers. The mechanism ihich uill
measure and channel his liability is not yet forged."
23. 446 F.2d 90, 101 (10th Cir. 1971).
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damage actions by Heit v. Weitzen and subsequent decisions, re-
moved all actual or potential boundaries on the scope of rule lOb-5
civil liability in the open-market setting. Notwithstanding the fact
that the restrictive Joseph notion of privity was discarded, the develop-
ment of meaningful limitations on the scope of potential liability for a
rule lOb-5 violation continued to command attention. But it did so
with a different perspective. Instead of looking to a privity or quasi-
privity relationship between a lOb-5 violator and a purchaser or seller
of the security, the inquiry came to focus upon a different type of cau-
sative relation or nexus between a securities transaction and the
claimed violation.
In cases dealing with the dissemination of false or misleading
information, such as Texas Gulf Sulphur (as it relates to the corporate
defendant), Heit v. Weitzen, and Mitchell, the courts found a sufficient
nexus to satisfy the "connection" requirement in that investors in the
marketplace were injured by misleading material statements that
were made in a manner reasonably calculated to influence the invest-
ing public. It is necessary to keep in mind, however, that while
Mitchell and its predecessors spoke of a broad notion of "connec-
tion" in the open-market setting, they also suggested that some ele-
ment of reliance was an element of the action. When the Texas Gulf
Sulphur court addressed the inequities of a securities market tainted
by informational imbalance, it also talked of "connection" in terms of
something being disseminated to that market which is "reasonably
calculated to influence. 24  And in Mitchell, while the court rejected
any suggestion that privity should be an element of rule lOb-5, it
did observe that "connection" requires "reliance" by allegedly in-
jured buyers and sellers.25
B. Nondisclosure Cases Prior to Shapiro
The problem with using reliance (or the foreseeability of it) as a
limiting factor on the scope of rule lOb-5 liability is, of course, that it
does not work in the nondisclosure setting, which is where the typical
insider trading case arises-there is simply nothing for the market to
rely on. Recognizing this shortcoming as early as 1965, the Second
Circuit delcared in List v. Fashion Park Inc. that, in a nondisclosure
setting, the proper test is not reliance, but rather "whether the plaintiff
would have been influenced to act differently than he did act if the
defendant had disclosed to him the undisclosed fact.
26
That decision was amplified by the Second Circuit's later deci-
24. 401 R2d at 862.
25. 446 F.2d at 101-02.
26. 340 F.2d 457, 463 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965).
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sion in Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co. 27  There a customer sued his
broker-dealer under rule lOb-5 for his failure to disclose that the firm
had a market-making role in the securities which it had sold to the
plaintiff on a principal basis. The broker-dealer asserted that it could
not be held civilly liable to the plaintiff in the absence of a showing
that the plaintiff had actually relied on the firm's recommendation
28to purchase the stock. But the court rejected this contention on the
ground that in a nondisclosure setting the proper test for determining
the scope of lOb-5 liability was not reliance, but rather "causation in
fact."29  The court clearly indicated, consistent with what the Texas
Gulf SulphurlHeit line of cases had established in the open market
setting, that the purchase made without disclosure of the material fact
coupled with the subsequent loss would suffice to impose liability3
Causation-in-fact had been sufficiently shown, the court held, and this
was all that was required to establish the requisite connection be-
tween the violation and the occurrence of the transaction which led
to the loss.
This developing notion of causation-in-fact as satisfying the "con-
nection" requirement was further expanded by the Supreme Court in
Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.,"' a decision arising under section 14(a)
of the Exchange Act and rule 14a-9, which prohibits misstatements
and omissions of material facts in proxy material. In Mills the court
held:
Where there has been a finding of materiality, a shareholder has made
a sufficient showing of casual relationship between the violation and the
injury for which he seeks redress if, as here, he proves that the proxy
solicitation itself, rather than the particular defect in the solicitation
materials, was an essential link in the accomplishment of the transac-
tion.32
Thus, materiality was held to be the only element necessary to estab-
lish causation under rule 14a-9.33
27. 438 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1970).
28. See id. at 1172.
29. Id.
30. The court addressed the point as follows:
To the extent that reliance is necessary for a finding of a lOb-5 violation in a
non-disclosure case such as this, the test is properly one of tort 'causation in fact.'
. . . Chasins relied upon Smith, Barney's recommendations of purchase made without
the disclosure of a material fact, purchased the securities recommended, and suffered a
loss in their resale. Causation in fact or adequate reliance wvas sufficiently shown by
Chasins.
Id. (citation omitted).
31. 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
32. 396 U.S. at 385.
33. Mills was an action by shareholders seeking to set aside a merger accomplished through
the use of a misleading proxy statement. The allegation was based upon an inadequate dis-
closure of the relationship of members of one board of directors to the other party in the merger.
1977)
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After receiving indirect judicial recognition in rule lOb-5 actions, 4
the Mills reasoning was applied directly to a lOb-5 case by the Su-
preme Court in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States.35 That case
involved a sale of shares by the plaintiffs through employees of a bank
at a price significantly below their market value, benefiting the bank
employees who were able to realize the gain for themselves. The
rule lOb-5 allegation focused upon the failure of the bank employees
to disclose the fact that the plaintiffs could sell their shares at a bet-
ter price elsewhere, and that the employees were in a position to gain
financially from the sales through them. The Court held:
Under the circumstances of this case involving primarily a failure
to disclose, positive proof of reliance is not a prerequisite to recovery.
All that is necessary is that the facts withheld be material in the sense
that a reasonable investor might have considered them important in the
making of [his investment] decision. . . . This obligation to disclose
and this withholding of a material fact establish the requisite element of
causation in fact.
36
Thus, the use of reliance as a limiting factor in a nondisclosure setting
was ruled out by Affiliated Ute, whose rationale may well extend to
positive information dissemination settings as well.
37
A principal issue was whether any causal connection existed between the nondisclosure and the
merger, and as noted in the text the court found that materiality of the undisclosed fact wits
sufficient to show that causal connection.
34. See Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255, 269 (3d Cir. 1972); Kahan
v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161, 173-74 (3d Cir. 1970).
35. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
36. 406 U.S. at 153-54. The case has generally been regarded as establishing what is in
effect a presumption of reliance in nondisclosure cases. See, e.g., Titan Group, Inc. v. Faggen,
513 F.2d 234, 238-39 (2d Cir. 1975); Carras v. Burns, 516 F.2d 251, 257 (4th Cir. 1975). It
should be noted, however, that the Sixth Circuit has challenged this general presumption in
Chelsea Assocs. v. Rapanos, 527 F.2d 1266 (6th Cir. 1975). In that case the court declared
that the Affiliated Ute "presumption," and thus the causation-in-fact principle, is not conclusive,
and that where it is found that a plaintiff would not have relied uoon an undisclosed fact had It
been disclosed a dismissal is appropriate. The impact of the decision is the rejection of a strict
adherence to an Affiliated Ute causation/ materiality analysis.
More recently the Supreme Court has reaffirmed the holding in Affillated Ute that reliance
need not be alleged or proven in a nondisclosure case. Ernst & Ernst v. Holihfelder, 425 U.S.
185, (1976). See also Competitive Assocs., Inc. v. Laventhol, Krekstcin, Horwath & Horwath,
516 F.2d 811, 814 (2d Cir. 1975) ("[a]s a matter of law, the district court erred in its determina-
tion that plaintiff could not prevail unless it could prove direct reliance" because Affillated (Ite
rejected such a restrictive reading of rule lob-5 and that "the test is properly one of tort 'cau-
sation in fact' "); Zipkin v. Genesco, Inc. [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. Rts. (CCH)
95,409 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
37. See Note, The Nature and Scope of the Reliance Requirement in Private Actions
Under SEC Rule lOb-5, 24 CASE WEs. RES. L. Rav. 363, 385-46 (1973). Even before Aills
and Affiliated Ute, plaintiffs had been permitted to establish that the defendants' actions
caused injury to them without any showing of reliance when the injury resulted from the im-
pact of the defendants' misrepresentation upon others. For exarnple, in Vine v. Beneficial Fin,
Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1967) a plaintiff successfully claimed injury after having been
forced to dispose of stock in a short-form merger after the defendant had, by means of misrep-
resentations, acquired sufficient shares to cause the merger transaction. And in Crane Co. v.
Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787, 797 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822
(1970), the court held that it was not required that a plaintiff whose tender offer had been
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C. The Shapiro Case
Applying the causation-in-fact analysis of Affiliated Ule and Mills
to the insider-trading context, one may properly posit that when an in-
sider is in possession of undisclosed material information and uses
that information to his personal trading advantage, in violation of the
disclose or abstain rule, aid another individual buys or sells in the
marketplace without that information and suffers injury thereby, there
is a sufficient causal link between the failure to disclose and the dam-
age suffered by the outsider to permit a rule lOb-5 recovery. There
is, in other words, causation-in-fact, and with the rejection of any re-
quirement of privity or reliance, this is all that is necessary.
This was, of course, precisely the analysis of Shapiro v. Merrill,
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith.38 Shapiro affirmed the imposition of
rule lOb-5 liability against insiders who had tipped material inside in-
formation to certain outside traders, who were then able to dispose of
securities profitably in advance of a serious decline in market price
following public disclosure of the adverse information.3' Liability
was extended to benefit every purchaser of Douglas Aircraft Corpo-
ration stock on the New York Stock Exchange from the time of the
"tippee" trading up to the public disclosure of the adverse informa-
tion by the company.
Since Shapiro was an open-market case, there was obviously no
way to match buyers with inside sellers. Moreover, if the court re-
quired plaintiffs to match particular purchases and sales, liability
could only result for defendants whose sales could be traced to particu-
lar open-market buyers. While the argument for requiring such match-
ing was made at the district court level in Shapiro, Judge Tenney
rejected it out of hand. To accept it, he said, would be to reduce the
private right of recovery under rule lOb-5 to "a game of roulette."
40
The Second Circuit also rejected the contention that insider trad-
ing liability for damages should be extended only to those situations
where transactions by insiders and outsiders could be directly matched.
First the court held that the duty imposed by Texas Gulf Sulphur ex-
tended to the entire market:
We also reject defendants' second asserted ground for distinguish-
ing Texas Guf-that our 'disclose or abstain' rule is not applicable here
because the only duty owed by defendants was to purchasers of the spe-
cific shares of Douglas stock sold by defendants and the transactions
here involved were not face-to-face sales to plaintiffs. This argument
thwarted by fraudulent conduct of a competing tender offeror demonstrate reliance upon de-
fendant's misrepresentations since the success of the fraud depended upon the volitional acts
of the tender offerees.
38. 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974).
39. See id. at 238-241.
40. 353 F. Supp. 264, 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
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totally misconstrues our Texas Gulf rule .... It also ignores the fact
that these transactions occurred on an anonymous national securities
exchange where as a practical matter it would be impossible to identify
a particular defendant's sale with a particular plaintiff's purchase. And
it would make a mockery of the 'disclose or abstain' rule if we were to
permit the fortuitous riatching of buy and sell orders to determine
whether a duty to disclose had been violated. . . . To hold that Sec-
tion 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 impose a duty to disclose material inside in-
formation only in face-to-face transactions or to the actual purchasers or
sellers on an anonymous public stock exchange, would be to frustrate a
major purpose of the antifraud provisions of the securities laws: to in-
sure the integrity and efficiency of the securities markets .... We de-
cline defendants' invitation to sanction a result which Section 10(b) and
Rule lOb-5 clearly were intended to foreclose. . . . We hold that de-
fendants owed a duty-for the breach of which they may be held liable
in this private action for damages-not only to the purchasers of the actual
shares sold by the defendants (in the unlikely event they can be identi-
fied) but to all persons who during the same period purchased Douglas
stock in the open market without knowledge of th- material inside infor-
mation which was in possession of the defendants.4 '
Having determined that defendants owed a duty under the prin-
ciple of Texas Gulf Sulphur to the entire open market, the Second Cir-
cuit disposed of defendants' further contention that causation-in-fact
had not been established between the defendants' rule lOb-5 viola-
tions and the losses suffered by the open-market purchasers. Texas
Gulf Sulphur and its progeny, while establishing the basis for finding a
rule lOb-5 violation, did not clearly supply the requisite nexus be-
tween that violation and the open-market trading in a nondisclosure
setting so as to permit private recovery, although Judge Bonsal in
Astor v. Texas Gulf Sulphur4' 2 had indicated that liability for damages
could be imposed for insider trading in the open-market setting by
ruling against the insiders' motion for summary judgment. The miss-
ing nexus, however, was supplied by the Supreme Court's holding in
Affiliated Ute that proof of the materiality of an undisclosed fact, if
there exists a duty to disclose it, establishes causation-in-fact:
43
41. 495 F.2d at 236-37.
42. 306 F. Supp. 1333 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). This was a consoidation of some sixty separate
civil actions arising out of the Texas Gulf Sulphur circumstances. Former shareholders of the
company sought money damages against multiple defendants, including those who had engaged
in insider trading. All of the defendants moved for summary judgment on the plaintiffs' claims.
and in particular those defendants from whom damages were sought on the basis of insider
trading. Those particular defendants urged "that they had no duty to disclose the information
to the TGS shareholders and that their transactions do not give rise to private actions lor
damages against them." 306 F. Supp. at 1339. But on the ba,is of the Second Circuit'% de-
cision in Texas Gulf Sulphur, Judge Bonsai refused to dismiss the claims against these insiders,
and in so doing rejected the notion that any traditional privily relationship must exist be-
tween insiders and outside traders, saying instead that "the qutstion is whether the plaintiflf
or any of them would have been influenced to act differently than they did if they had known
the material information at the time of [their] sale, and if th.-y would, whether they were
damaged by defendants' conduct." 306 F. Sup5. at 1342.
43. 406 U.S. at 153-54. The pertinent language is quoted in the text accompanying note
36, supra.
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[T]his holding in Affiliated Ute surely warrants our conclusion that the
requisite element of causation in fact has been established by the ad-
mitted withholding by defendants of material inside information which
they were under an obligation to disclose, such information clearly ma-
terial in the sense that plaintiffs as reasonable investors might have con-
sidered it important in making their decision to purchase Douglas
stock.44
In subsequent consideration of Shapiro at the district court level45
Judge Tenney addressed the question of the extent of the duty posited
by the Second Circuit in the course of determining the boundaries of
the plaintiff class. Judge Tenney initially noted:
The duty is imposed on both non-trading tippers and trading tippees
. . . and extends to all purchasers trading contenmporaneously with de-
fendants' wrongdoing, that is, 'while such inside information remains
undisclosed.' . . . Given the nature of this duty and the nature of its
breach, logic compels the conclusion that liability be coterminous with
46the duty breached by the wrongdoer.
Plaintiffs urged that the class should include all persons who pur-
chased in the open market without the benefit of the inside informa-
tion from the time of the first illegal sale by a defendant (June 21,
1966) through the date of the first public announcement of the infor-
mation (June 24, 1966). Defendants, on the other hand, contended
that the outer parameter of the class should be limited to the period
of insider trading rather than extending to the time of the initial pub-
lic disclosure of information, a period approximately one day shorter
than that sought by plaintiffs.
On the basis of the passage quoted above, which determined the
period of wrongdoing to be the time during which an informational im-
balance in the market existed, Judge Tenney rejected the defendants'
position. He found that the breach of defendants' rule lOb-5 duty
continued from the time of the first insider trade until the time at
which the informational imbalance was corrected, regardless of
whether insider trading continued to occur throughout that entire
period of time:
Upon full public disclosure of the material facts the information
loses its confidential inside character. Once the public is restored to its
position of equal access by circulation of the material information, the
duty to abstain or disclose is abrogated. The breach which occurred
with the first disobedient sale likewise terminates. To hold that the
duty ceases before the opportunity for effective public discovery would
contravene the compensatory and deterrent purposes of lOb-5 liability.
44. 495 F.2d at 240.
45. [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,377. at 98.875 (S.D.N.Y.
1975).
46. Id. at 98,878 (citations omitted, italics in original).
1977]
OHIO STATE LA W JOURNA L
In a private civil action the wrongdoer remains liable until his unlawful
conduct is corrected.
47
Thus, the duty imposed by the Texas Gulf Sulphur "disclose or abstain"
rule was held to extend to all open-market traders, and the breach of
that duty was connected by causation-in-fact analysis to all open-
market activity from the date of the first trade until the disclosure
of the material information to the marketplace. The results reached
in Shapiro at both the district and appellate court levels represented
extensive and carefully reasoned applications of well established and
largely unchallenged principles. In Fridrich v. Bradford, however, the
Sixth Circuit confronted not only Shapiro, but all that underlies it as
well.
II. Fridrich v. Bradford: AN OPEN ASSAULT ON Shapiro
Fridrich arose out of the purchase on April 27, 1972, by J.C. Brad-
ford, Jr. of 1,225 shares of the common stock of Old Line Life Insur-
ance Company.48 The shares of Old Line were traded in the over-the-
counter market and particular shares purchased by Bradford were ac-
quired through J.C. Bradford & Co., a Nashville broker-dealer of which
Bradford and his father were the managing partners. Bradford's
shares were purchased after he had received a tip from his father con-
cerning the commencement of negotiations for the acquisition of Old
Line on extremely favorable terms.49  After learning of the negota-
tions, Bradford purchased his shares in the open market at $37.00 per
share. Subsequent to his purchase, and following public disclosure of
an agreement to merge Old Line with U.S. Life Corporation, Old Line
shares increased substantially in value and Bradford sold at a handsome
profit. Patterns of trading by others in possession of the inside in-
formation followed that of Bradford.
47. Id. (emphasis added).
48. While principal focus was placed on the activities of J.C. Bradford, Jr.. he was only one
of five defendants in the case. Others named were J.C. Bradford. Sr., J.C. Bradford and Co..
J.C. Bradford & Co., Inc., and Life Stock Research Corp. J.C. Bradford & Co., Inc., a corpo-
ration, was wholly owned by the partners of J.C. Bradford and Co. Life Stock Research Corp,
was an investment company of which controlling interest was owned by J.C. Bradford & Co.,
Inc. Among the five defendants, the court characterized the activities of J.C. Bradford, Sr. as
being dominant in the sense that it was he who "put together a syndicate to purchase a con-
trolling block of Old Line stock" and subsequently participated directly in merger negotiations.
It was the senior Bradford who tipped the inside information to his son, who then became
the central figure in the litigation. 542 F.2d at 308-09.
49. The senior Bradford had beeri directly involved in negotiations for the acquisition of
Old Line. J.C. Bradford and Co. had been the principal market maker in Old Line Stock since
1961, and during a period in which Old Line was viewed as a target for merger or acquisition
efforts, Bradford, Sr. was often approached. In 1972 Bradford set out to negotiate the acquisi-
tion by U.S. Life Corp., and ultimately arranged favorable terms. It was after the commence-
ment of those negotiations in April 1972 that Bradford, Sr. began purchasing Old Line share,.
for the account of his wife and of Life Stock Research Corp. He also informed his son of the
negotiations, thus leading to those purchases.
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Following consummation of the Old Line/U.S. Life merger, the
Securities and Exchange Commission commenced an investigation
into the circumstances of trading prior to the first public announce-
ment of the merger negotiations. The investigation led to the com-
mencement of an injunctive action in November 1972 in which the
Commission charged that Bradford and others had violated rule 1Ob-5
in connection with the purchase and sale of Old Line common stock.50
The proceedings were terminated by a consent decree, which as to
Bradford required the disgorgement of the profit realized on his pur-
chase and sale of Old Line shares, permanently enjoined him from
further violations of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5, and suspended his
performance of any business activities as a broker-dealer for twenty
days. The consent judgment also provided for a mechanism by
which persons who had sold Old Line shares to J.C. Bradford & Co.
during pertinent periods of time could recover from that firm the dif-
ference between the price at which they sold and forty dollars per
share.51
In April 1973 the civil action by Fridrich and others was com-
menced in the United States District Court for the Middle District
of Tennessee. 52  The complaint charged defendants with violation of
section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 by reason of their trading in Old Line
stock while in possession of material undisclosed information.53 None
50. SEC v. Bradford, No. 72-Civ.-4776 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)
51. The mechanism, an escrow fund, was not something specifically sought by the Com-
mission in its injunctive action. Rather, after the SEC complaint Aas filed on November 10,
1972, the two Bradfords and Life Stock Research Corp. entered into an escrow agreement
under which they agreed to deposit with a Nashville bank funds that could be disbursed to claim-
ants "found to be entitled thereto under any judgment entered against these defendants."
542 F.2d, at 311 n.ll. In consenting to an SEC injunction, the defendants acknowledged.
and the court ordered, that the fund be held and disbursed to persons who filed claims to
it as either of the following: (1) noncustomers who sold to J.C. Bradford & Co. from April 21,
1972 to April 27, 1972; and (2) customers who sold to J.C. Bradford & Co. from April 21.
1972 to June 29, 1972. The court noted that a total of S127,567.94 was ultimately paid out
of the fund to claimants.
52. [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94.723, at 96,392 (M.D.
Tenn. 1974). The complaint filed in the district court alleged that the plaintiffs sold approxi-
mately 14,000 shares of Old Line stock on June 13, 14, and 15, 1972 and that their sales would
not have been made had they known of the impending merger. Plaintiffs alleged that the de-
fendants were in possession of undisclosed material information about the merger during the
period from April 19, 1972 until November 20, 1972, and that insider trading took place during
that period. Damages were sought in the amount of the difference between the price re-
ceived for plaintiffs' stock in their June 1972 sales and the highest bid price reached during
the period up to November 20, 1972.
53. Additional allegations were stated under SEC rule lOb-6, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-6. Rule
lOb-6 prohibits certain activities by participants in a distribution of securities. The essential
prohibition of the rule is that one participating in a distribution may not bid for or purchase
any security that is the subject of the distribution until that participation is completed. An ap-
plication of rule lOb-6 was sought in Fridrich by reason of the market-maker status of J.C. Brad-
ford & Co. and the fact that, as the district court found, an acquisition of a companys securi-
ties in exchange for securities of another company constitutes a distribution of those securities
with respect to which the rule lOb-6 proscription would be operative. Thus, the district court
found that rule lOb-6 would be violated "during the period when the terms of the acquisition
agreement are being established and put into effect; and any broker-dealer participating in
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of the Fridrich plaintiffs were entitled to recovery from J.C. Bradford
& Co. under the mechanism established in connection with the SEC
proceedings, since these plaintiffs' transactions did not involve Brad-
ford or any of his associates.54
On stipulations of fact and other evidence submitted, including
deposition testimony taken in the course of the prior SEC investiga-
tion, the district court found that the defendants had violated rule
lOb-5 by trading while in possession of material inside information.
On the basis of Shapiro, liability was found to extend to the "invest-
ing public" trading in the same market. As to the extent of recovery,
the court held:
Each plaintiff sold Old Line stock during the period of nondisclosure
and is therefore entitled to damages as a result of defendants' nondis-
closure in violation of rule lOb-5. . . .The measure of damages is the
difference between the price each plaintiff received for his shares sold
during the period of nondisclosure ... and the highest value reached
by Old Line stock within a reasonable time after the tortious conduct
was discovered and disclosure made of the information wrongfully with-
held.55
Interestingly, the key date used by the district court as the starting
point for looking to "highest value" reached after discovery and dis-
closure was not the date of a press release in June 1972 respecting
merger negotiations, but rather was determined to be November 10,
1972, the date of the SEC consent decree. The court found that the
highest value reached during a period of twenty days following that
judgment was fifty-eight dollars per share, and on this basis assessed
damages against defendants in an aggregate sum of $361,186.75.
This calculation and the key date on which it is based, rather clearly
leads to the conclusion that at least in the eyes of the district court
the "period of nondisclosure" did not end with public disclosure of
the merger negotations on June 29, 1972. While there was some
suggestion by the court that nondisclosure of at least one fact did
continue, 56 it would appear that Shapiro was being stretched by such
an expansive recovery, and that fact likely contributed to the extreme-
ly restrictive position adopted by the Sixth Circuit on appeal. Indeed,
hegotiation of the terms of such an acquisition . . . trades in the securities being acquired,"
[1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94.723. at 96.405. In its conideration
of this alternative holding of the district court, the Sixth Circuit rejected it summarily with
the simple observation that its conclusion on the major rule lOb-5 -oint that the defendant' con-
duct in no way caused any loss to plaintiffs "is equally applicable to a theory of liability under
Rule lOb-6." 542 F.2d at 323.
54. The plaintiffs' shares were not sold to J.C. Bradford & Co.. rather, their transactionq
were effected through an unrelated broker who testified that he had no knowledge of the pro-
posed merger at the time of plaintiffs' sales.
55. [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 94,723, at 96,406-07,
56. The court found that facts regarding a "finders fee" to be paid to Bradford, Sr. as
part of the merger transaction were not fully disclosed prior to the actual merger. Id. at 96.406.
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the court of appeals set the stage for its dramatic pronouncement by
referring to the district court consideration as an illustration of the
"Draconian liability" to which persons who trade on inside information
can be subjected under rule lOb-5.
The issue on appeal in Fridrich was succinctly identified by
Judge Engle: "In the final analysis, the question is how far the courts
are to extend the private civil right of action under Section 10(b) and
Rule lOb-5 when the alleged violation is the unlawful use of inside
information and the stock involved is traded on an impersonal mar-
ket."58 In resolving that issue the court determined that Shapiro had
gone too far, and that both law and policy compelled a clear restric-
tion on liability to those situations in which there is a direct causal
connection between a trade on inside information and a claimed
loss by an open-market trader. The Sixth Circuit declared: "Inves-
tors must be prepared to accept the risk of trading in an open market
without complete or always accurate information. 59
For the starting point of its analysis the court quite logically,
and necessarily, chose Texas Gulf Sulphur and the "disclose or ab-
stain" rule for which it stands. But after quoting the crucial Second
Circuit language regarding that duty, Judge Engle observed that Texas
Gulf Sulphur "involved an SEC enforcement action against the com-
pany and several corporate investors. That particular case did not
involve an attempt to impose civil liability for damages upon insiders
who trade in the open market without disclosure of inside information."O
To determine whether civil liability could be imposed in the non-
disclosure setting, the court looked back to the 1951 decision in
Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio and Television Corp.61 as enunciating
the controlling principle. That principle, in the eyes of the court,
is that a "semblance of privity" must exist between one in possession
of inside information and another transacting in the open market in
order for liability to attach on the insider trading. The principle was,
in the court's view, buttressed by the district court decision in Reynolds
v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,62 in which recovery on a rule lOb-5 claim
by an open-market purchaser based on an insider trading violation was
denied. The Reynolds court held:
Plaintiff Karlson sold his stock on December 11, 1963 through a
stock exchange. There was no face to face transaction. [Defendant-
insider] did not purchase the particular shares sold by Karlson. While
it is not necessary for Karison to establish privity of contract in order to
57. See 542 F.2d at 309.
58. Id. at 314.
59. Id. at318.
60. Id. at 315.
61. 99 F. Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), a.'d per curiam 198 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1952).
62. 309 F. Supp. 548 (D. Utah 1970).
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recover for violations of the statute or the rule, and the fact that there
was a total non-disclosure would not prevent recovery if some form of
manipulation was involved, it nevertheless is necessary for Karlson to
prove some causative effect.63
Having distinguished Texas Gulf Sulphur, the Sixth Circuit in
Fridrich had only to face Shapiro. Correctly recognizing that rule
lOb-5 carries with it the requirement that some "causal connection"
exist between a defendant's misconduct and a plaintiffs loss, the
court proceeded to attack the underlying principle of Shapiro as stated
by Judge Tenney-that "[i]t is not the act of trading which causes
plaintiffs' injury, it is the act of trading without disclosing material
inside information which causes plaintiffs' injury . , 4 Confront-
ing this principle in Fridrich, Judge Engle declared:
The flaw in this logic, we conclude, is that it as:;umes the very injury
which it then declares compensable. It does so by presupposing that the
duty to disclose is absolute, and that the plaintiff is injured when the
information is denied him. The duty to disclose, however, is not an
absolute one, but an alternative one, that of disclosing or abstaining from
trading. We conceive it to be the act of trading which essentially con-
stitutes the violation of Rule lOb-5, for it is this which brings the illicit
benefit to the insider, and it is this conduct which impairs the integrity
of the market and which is the target of the rule. If the insider does
not trade, he has an absolute right to keep material information secret.
. . Investors must be prepared to accept the risk of trading in an open
market without complete or always accurate information. Defendants'
trading did not alter plaintiffs' expectations when they sold their stock,
and in no way influenced plaintiffs' trading decisionm. 65
Although Judge Engle attributed to Shapiro the assumption that the
duty to disclose under rule lOb-5 is absolute, Shapiro, made no such
assumption. The real thrust of Fridrich is not directed at the assump-
tion of an absolute duty, but rather the assumption of injury to ig-
norant open-market traders supplied by causation-in-fact analysis,
which connects the breach of the duty by insider trading to transac-
tions in the open market by those not possessed of the inside informa-
tion.
The basic reasoning employed by the court in its attack is in-
triguing. It is to be expected, says the court, that investors in an open
market face the "risk" of trading without complete or always accurate
information; and this is so whether someone trades while in posses-
sion of material inside information or does not. How then, the court
asks, does it make any difference to the open-market trader whether
insider trading has occurred? While that insider may violate rule
63. Id. at 558.
64. 353 F. Supp. at 278. See text accompanying notes 41-46 supra.
65. 542 F.2d at 318.
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lOb-5 by trading on undisclosed material information, and in so doing
"impair the integrity of the market," if it has no direct impact upon
open-market traders it cannot support civil recovery.
Thus, recognizing without equivocation that insider trading brings
illicit benefit to the insider, impairs the integrity of the market,
and as such is the target of rule lOb-5, the court refused to recognize
any requisite nexus between that conduct and individual traders in
the market. Shapiro, of course, found the requisite nexus in the
Affiliated Ute/Mills view of causation.66 The Sixth Circuit, however,
distinguished Affiliated Ute on the basis of the kind of relationship
there involved between plaintiffs and defendants. After quoting the
Supreme Court's critical language regarding the obligation to disclose
coupled with the withholding of a material fact as establishing requisite
causation, Judge Engle declared:
It is this language which the Second Circuit, in Shapiro, felt to be
controlling upon it. We are unable to construe the language so broadly.
It was shown in Affiliated Ute that the defendant bank employees had
engaged in prior business dealings with the plaintiff Indians. They
entered into a deliberate scheme to induce the plaintiffs to sell their
stock without disclosure of material facts which would have influenced
the decision to sell. The resulting sales were a direct result of the
scheme. Thus it comes as no surprise that the Supreme Court con-
cluded that '[U]nder the circumstances of this case . . . all that was
necessary was that the information withheld be material in order to
establish the requisite causation.'67
The correct interpretation of Affiliated Ute, according to the Sixth
Circuit, is that since the plaintiffs and defendants had a relationship
between them that involved a direct scheme to induce defendants to
act-to sell their shares-the plaintiffs there had a right to expect that
defendants would disclose all material facts to them. That direct
relationship is what the court found lacking in Fridrich,68 and, by
66. See text accompanying notes 43-44 supra.
67. 542 F.2d at 319 (citation omitted).
68. In a footnote the court impliedly commented on the situation in which it might up-
hold a private remedy. The reference by Judge Engle was as follows:
We specifically do not reach the question of availability of the remedy to open
market situations where the insider trading with resultant price changes has in fact in-
duced the plaintiffs to buy or sell to their injury. . . . Here there %as no proof that
defendants' insider trading had any impact whatever upon the value of Old Line stock.
Id. at 320 n.27.
The court's approach to "causation" analysis, and its restrictive reading of the Affiliated
Ute/Mills causation reasoning is somewhat at odds with an earlier decision by another Sixth
Circuit panel. In Ohio Drill & Tool Co. v. Johnson, 498 F.2d 186 (6th Cir. 1974). the court had
occasion to consider a trial court determination in a proxy case that in order for losses to be re-
coverable under the proxy rules, those losses must be shown to have resulted from the nondis-
closure in the proxy material. This, of course, is a strict causation approach. The Sixth Circuit
rejected it, however, as being "a misapprehension of the law." 498 F.2d at 192. And indeed.
on the basis of Mills the Sixth Circuit concluded: "The district court's holding that the plain-
tiffs must show a causal relationship between nondisclosures and the defendants' election to of-
fice in addition to demonstrating the materiality of the non-disclosures would constitute a blow
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necessary implication, in Shapiro as well. The court was thus able
to declare: "We hold, therefore, the defendants' act of trading with
third persons was not causally connected with any claimed loss by
plaintiffs who traded on the impersonal market and who were other-
wise unaffected by the wrongful acts of the insider. 69
Thus, the reintroduction of an element tantamount to traditional
common-law privity into rule lOb-5 analysis is clear in Fridrich.
When the court rejects any open market causation-in-fact interpreta-
tion, and looks instead to the need for a direct relationship between a
plaintiff and defendant, the inescapable conclusion is that privity is
required. To be sure, Fridrich does not stand for the proposition that
the necessary relationship be one of absolute contractual privity be-
tween an insider and an open-market trader, but it does require a
relationship tantamount to that based upon reliance notions.7 Stated
differently, theSixth Circuit has imposed a requirement that in order
for private damage recovery under rule lOb-5 to be available, it
must be demonstrated that an open-market plaintiff bought or sold
because of an insider's transaction, and not simply on the basis of
an independent investment decision not influenced by the insider
trade. The attempted revival of such a privity element in rule lOb-5
civil actions was expressly and emphatically rejected by Judge Tenney
in his subsequent consideration of the extent of insider-trading lia-
bility for damages following the Second Circuit decision in Shaprio.7
Perhaps sensing the impact of its holding in the face of Shapiro,
the Fridrich court sought to buttress its conclusions with policy
considerations. The thrust of the court's policy analysis is simple:
a violation of rule lOb-5 in open-market transactions does not in-
variably mean that a damages remedy must be available. Indeed,
in the words of Judge Engle:
The key issue, as we see it, is not whether the proscriptions of
§ 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 should encompass open market transactions,
to the proxy disclosure rules." 498 F.2d at 192. Such concern for the viability of private recov-
ery under the proxy rules was obviously not carried over into rule lOb-5 analysis in Fridrh. Tlhe
opinion in Ohio Drill was written by Judge Miller, joined by Judges McCree and Celebreute,
69. 542 F.2d at 318-19.
70. The relationship that the court found to be requisite to sustain a rule l0b-5 claim
might be more accurately characterized as transactional privity. It is not necessary that buyers
and sellers be matched in the contractual privity sense, but it is necessary to find that a particu-
lar transaction in the open market occurred because of an insider's trading activity, The re-
lationship is direct in every sense, but not contractual.
71. In response to the Shapiro defendants' contention that liability should be limited to
only the period during which there was actual insider trading, Judge Tenney made this obser-
vation:
During the momentary span of a defendant's sell order, the only purchases occurring
probably corresponded with the shares sold. If liability were limited to the precise
period of a defendant's trade, the effective result would be a revival of the element of
privity. Shapiro dictated that " ' privity' between plaintiffs and defendants is not a re-
quisite element of a Rule lob-5 cause of action for damages,"
[1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,377, at 98,878.
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which they should, but whether the civil remedy must invariably be co-
extensive in its reach with the reach of the SEC, which under the Act,
was designated by the Congress as the primary vehicle of its enforce-
ment.
72
The principal concern of the court was the potential for massive
damage liability that is almost unlimited in scope. The court saw this
result as doing nothing more than creating a "windfall" for those
people astute or fortunate enough to be aware of their rights as
open-market traders-a result that the court felt would do violence
to the intent of the statute and the rule." Judge Engle contrasted the
Fridrich open-market situation with the essentially face-to-face situa-
tions in which rule lOb-5 has been employed:
[E]xtension of the private remedy to impersonal market cases where
plaintiffs have neither dealt with defendants nor been influenced in their
trading decisions by any act of the defendants would present a situation
wholly lacking in the natural limitations on damages present in cases
dealing with face-to-face transactions.74
Nor, according to the court, is there a sufficient policy of deter-
rence to support the extension of civil liability in these circumstances.
The Exchange Act provides a well-stocked arsenal of sanctions to
deter insider misconduct and the courts have broad general equity
powers to require disgorgement by an insider of ill-gotten gains.
And, of course, the court had before it an illustration of just that sort
of power in the form of the SEC consent decree against Bradford,
which had required disgorgement of his profit."
5
In light of these policy justifications by the Sixth Circuit for its
holding, the line of demarcation between Fridrich and Shapiro could
not be any bolder. What the Sixth Circuit viewed as a potentially
unlimited extension of insider trading liability in the open-market set-
ting "could not only lead to individual injustice, but would have the
effect of leading corporate officers, directors and other insiders to re-
frain from trading in the corporation with which they are associated.
We cannot believe that this unhealthy result was intended by Congress
in enacting the 1934 Act.
7 6
72. 542 F.2d at 320,
73. Id. at 320-21. In a footnote reference Judge Engle calculated the potential exposure
of Bradford at some seven million dollars, assuming a recovery by the class of open-market
traders during the period of April 21, 1972 through November 20, 1972.
74. Id. at 321.
75. Judge Engle did add this, however "Whether the sanctions imposed upon the defen-
dants here together with others which were also available amount to a sufficient vindication of
the public rights and to an adequate deterrent to future misconduct we need not say. We
may at least observe that the impact is bound to be significant." Id. at 322.
76. Id., n.33.
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III. Fridrich IN CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE
A. The Technical Legal Analysis: Failure to Recognize
the Duty to Disclose
According to the Sixth Circuit in Fridrich, the fact that some
traders may have undisclosed, material information on which they base
investment decisions, while in the same market others do not, does not
mean that any wrong compensable under rule lOb-5 has occurred.
Thus, an insider's gain by reason of a trade on undisclosed material
information is of no consequence to the unknowing outsider who would
have lost anyway by trading in an unknowing market. This view, al-
though short on judicial foundation,77 is not entirely without support
78
among legal writers. It is the same argument that was put before
Judge Tenney in his initial consideration of Shapiro, and which he
found to lead to "repugnant" results.
79
In that first Shapiro opinion Judge Tenney recognized the de-
ceptive persuasiveness of this approach to insider trading liability.
He noted that its roots go deep in our fundamental concept of tort
law that an injured party will not receive compensation for damages
not actually caused by a defendant's acts. But the notion of causa-
tion that underlies this argument, as applied to insider trading liability,
is based on the initial premise that, irrespective of whether an insider
trades or abstains from trading while in possession of inside informa-
tion, outsiders would still have traded. Judge Tenney looked upon
the situation in a much broader perspective. Even assuming the truth-
fulness of this premise, he declared that the entire contention is
fallacious, for "it is not the act of trading which causes plaintiffs'
injury, it is the act of trading without disclosing material inside informa-
tion which causes plaintiffs' injury."80
The sole concern in Fridrich is the act of trading by an insider.
In the abstract view of the Sixth Circuit, an insider trade (given to be
a rule lOb-5 violation) and the occurrence of an open-market trans-
action or ongoing transactions cannot be connected for purposes of a
private recovery unless the latter occurs because of the former. But
this view ignores the legal impact of the act of trading, i.e., creation
of the duty to disclose.
77. Fridrich cites two cases in support of this proposition: Reynolds, discussed in text ac-
companying notes 62-63 supra, and Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,
315 F. Supp. 42, 44 (D. Colo. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 474 F.2d 514 (10th Cir, 1973).
78. See Ratner, Federal and State Roles in the Regulation of Insider Trading, 31 Bts.
LAWYER 947, 954-57 (1976); Comment, Fashioning a Lid for Pandora's Box: A Legitlhnate
Role for Rule lob-5 in Private Actions Against Insider Trading on a National Stock Exchange,
16 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 404 (1969); Note, Civil Liability Under Section lob and Rule lob-S A Sug-
gestion for Replacing the Doctrine of Privity, 74 YALE L.J. 658 (1965).
79. 353 F. Supp. 264, 277-78 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
80. Id. at 278.
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The act of trading on inside information is itself a violation of
section 10(b) and rule lOb-5, as indeed the Sixth Circuit recognized.
But the teaching of Texas Gulf Sulphur and its progeny is that the
analysis does not stop there because that act of trading, unlawful in and
of itself, at the same time gives rise to a duty to disclose-a duty that
runs to the marketplace and all those trading in that marketplace-
which is also breached. In Fridrich Judge Engle looked to Texas
Gulf Sulphur for the proposition that "[i]f an insider does not trade,
he has an absolute right to keep material information secret.""1 That,
of course, is precisely correct, but it is only one side of the coin. The
other side is that if the insider does trade, then under the fundamental
Texas Gulf Sulphur "disclose or abstain" rule the insider has a duty
to disclose. It is this duty which the court ignores.
It is impossible to rationalize, as Judge Engle does, that the act
of insider trading does not alter the informational imbalance in a
market when undisclosed material information exists-or the ongoing
trading in that fact-deficient market-if one recognizes the existence of
a duty to disclose that is triggered by the act of insider trading.
Clearly, the most problematic passage of the Fridrich opinion is where
the application of the "disclose or abstain" principle is discussed:
The duty to disclose ...is not an absolute one, but an alternative one,
that of either disclosing or abstaining from trading. We conceive it to
be the act of trading which essentially constitutes the violation of Rule
lOb-5, for it is this which brings the illicit benefit to the insider, and it is
this conduct which impairs the integrity of the market and which is the
target of the rule.82
Therein lies the flaw of Fridrich. The act of trading on inside infor-
mation does indeed constitute the rule lOb-5 violation, but as the court
itself recognizes in no uncertain terms, that act then gives rise to a
duty to disclose. The logical next question is a duty to whom? And
what, then, if that duty is breached? These questions were never
reached by the court, yet the opinion and its assault on Shapiro begs
their consideration.
The Shapiro result cannot be successfully attacked without con-
fronting its most basic premise-the duty to disclose to the entire market-
place that arises upon the act of an insider trade. In Fridrich the
Sixth Circuit failed even to attempt this confrontation by erroneously
attributing to Shapiro a presupposition that the duty to disclose is
"absolute" irrespective of whether there is insider trading.83 The
duty is not absolute, and neither Shapiro nor the Texas Gulf Sulphur
line of cases suggests that it is. Rather, it is the act of trading that
81. 542 F.2d at 318.
82. Id.
83. Id.
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gives rise to the duty to disclose and the breach of this duty is con-
nected by causation-in-fact analysis to open-market transactions. In
the initial district court consideration in Shapiro Judge Tenney ad-
dressed the impact of the act of trading in this manner:
[H]ad the selling defendants decided not to trade, there would have been
no liability for plaintiffs' injury due to the eventual public disclosure of
Douglas' poor financial position. But defendants did not choose to fol-
low that course of action, and by trading in Douglas stock on a national
securities exchange they assumed the duty to disclose the information to
all potential buyers. It is the breach of this duty which gives rise to de-
fendants' liability. 4
Fridrich recognizes the act of trading as a violation but fails to then
consider the creation of a duty to disclose and, most importantly, the
impact of the breach of that duty.
B. The Court's Policy Justifications: A Question of
Whose Ox Gets Gored
The policy analysis undertaken by the Sixth Circuit stands for the
proposition that rule 10b-5 civil recovery for insider trading should be
precluded except in those rare instances in which some direct causal
relationship can be demonstrated to exist between a defendant and
an open-market purchaser or seller. Judge Celebrezze's suggestion
that the main opinion should be interpreted otherwise finds little sup-
port within it. Indeed, when given the opportunity to focus upon a
specific limitation on potential recovery-a realistic measure of
damages-the court declined to do so, finding no valid rule lOb-5 claim
in the first place and thus no need to consider any rule of limitation
on damages. 85 Presumably, any civil recovery by open-market plain-
tiffs in the Fridrich/ Shapiro circumstances, where an insider has not
had some direct, identifiable impact upon an open-market buyer or
seller, would lead "inexorably to an unjust and unworkable result." ' 6
The principal points of the Sixth Circuit's policy analysis are
these: (1) the extension of civil liability under rule lOb-5 beyond that
which is the subject of available SEC enforcement powers is contrary
to the intent of the statute and the rule; (2) no deterrent to unlawful
conduct is lost by precluding a rule lOb-5 private remedy; (3) the
SEC has an ample arsenal of sanctions for unlawful conduct supported
by general equity powers of the judiciary; and (4) state law may pro-
vide "various sanctions" against insider trading. The soundness of
these separate policy justifications for denying private civil recovery
largely depends upon whose ox gets gored.
84. 353 F. Supp. at 278.
85. 542 F.2d at 318.
86. Id.
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Fundamentally, private rights of action are implied under rule
lOb-5 and other provisions of the federal securities laws that provide no
express recovery either because such rights are deemed necessary
in the face of the lack of an effective statutory remedy, or because
such rights are necessary in light of the statutory purposes to provide
87a supplement to SEC enforcement powers. No intent was ever
expressed that there even be a private right of action under section
10(b) and rule lOb-5, let alone how far that remedy should reach in
various settings. There simply is no "intent" for rule lOb-5 that can
be mustered in support of any limitation on a remedy that was never
imagined by the drafters.88
The purpose of implying a private remedy under rule lOb-5 was
not to provide a deterrent to the commission of wrongful acts. In-
deed, from the beginning in Kardon v. National Gypsum,8 9 which
first recognized an implied private right of action under rule lOb-5,
the remedy was conceived to be compensatory in nature. In the years
preceding Kardon it had become very apparent that neither section
10(b) nor rule lOb-5 could have any real significance as protective
devices without a private right of enforcement that was compensatory
in nature. Then, as now, none of the available SEC sanctions un-
der the Exchange Act was compensatory.9° Judicial inclusion of
compensatory relief under rule lOb-5 gave that provision a truly pro-
tective effect that could not have obtained simply by SEC enforce-
ment actions coupled with requests for ancillary relief pursuant to the
general equity jurisdiction of the courts. Ordering the disgorgement
of profits realized by one who trades with the advantage of undisclosed
material information may lend support to the adage that crime does
not pay, but it does nothing to compensate those who have unwitting-
87. See, e.g., J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432-33 (1964). In Borak, the Supreme
Court recognized an implied private right of action under Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act,
with the court noting that such a private right was an absolute necessity as a supplement to SEC
action.
88. For an analysis of the background of rule l0b-5, see Sommer, Rule lOb-5: Notes for
Legislation, 17 CASE W. Ras. L. REV. 1029 (1966).
89. 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
90. Under provisions of the Exchange Act, government sanctions are limited to:
(a) Disciplining broker-dealers;
(b) Criminal prosecution of violators; and
(c) Injunctive relief from continued or future violations.
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f(b), 78a(e), 78ff (1973). In recent years the SEC has enjoyed consider-
able success in supplementing its statutory powers through "ancillary remedies." Such relief,
imposed under general equitable powers of the judiciary, includes: appointment of receivers:
special trustees or fiscal agents; restitution or disgorgement of profits; special independent
audit committees or board members; special counsel; rescission offers; accounting; undertak-
ings for establishment of compliance procedures, and others. See generally Bemporad, In-
junctive Relief in SEC Civil Actions: The Scope of Judicial Discretion, 10 CoLuMi. J. LAW AD
Soc. PROB. 328 (1974); Mathews, SEC Civil Injunctive Actions, 6 REVIEW OF SECL'IRMtES
REGULATION 955 (1973); Comment, Equitable Remedies in SEC Enforcement Action. 123 U.
PA. L. REV. 1188 (1975); Note, Ancillary Relief in SEC Injunction Suits for Violation of Rule
l0b-5, 79 HARv. L. REV. 656 (1966).
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ly lost in an unfair market. If, as the Sixth Circuit acknowledges,
the "target" of rule lOb-5 is conduct that "impairs the integrity of
the market,"9' it would seem that, rather than seeking to retreat from
the recognition of broad based compensatory relief to those trading in
a market so impaired, the court might well have heeded an earlier Su-
preme Court mandate that federal courts have a clear duty to provide
the remedies necessary to make effective the congressional purpose
of a statute.92  In that sense the answer to Judge Engle's rhetorical
question, "whether the civil remedy [under rule lOb-5] must invari-
ably be co-extensive in its reach with the reach of the SEC, which
under the Act, was designated by the Congress as the primary vehicle
of its enforcement '93 must be answered in the negative; it should be
broader.
Finally, even Judge Engle acknowledged that state law provides
little, if any, sanction against insider trading beyond corporate account-
ability of the insider. And no available state law claim would provide
compensatory relief to any open-market buyers and sellers,94 There-
fore, none of the policy justifications advanced by the Sixth Circuit
warrant the court's abrupt return to a privity limitation on rule lOb-5
actions for insider trading.
C. Summary: The Fundamental Error
The Shapiro decisions have prompted important and legitimate
questions, most of which focus on the causation element on which both
the district court and Second Circuit relied to connect the inside
traders' breach of duty with outside traders' damages. Fridrich is a
graphic expression of legitimate concern for truly massive liability po-
tential and the need for rational delineation of a scope of rule lOb-5
protection in the open-market setting. But the case represents an end
for which means were constructed. The court attempts to walk an
extremely fine line that posits that the Texas Gulf Sulphur "disclose
or abstain" principle is well established and correct, but that its exten-
sion into private liability analysis, as in Shapiro, is wrong. Unfor-
tunately, the court fails to confront the basic principle that it recog-
91. See 542 F.2d at 318.
92. See J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 430-33 (1964).
93. 542 F.2d at 520.
94. Id. at 322 n.32. Professor Ratner has characterized the status of state law in the
area as follows:
As far as persons on the other side of the market is [sic] concerned, it is pretty
clear they have no right of action under state law. The liberalizing trend of state deci-
sions on insider trading . . . has applied exclusively to direct transactions in rela-
tively closely held companies. When the insider trading takes place on an exchange
or organized over-the-counter market, Goodwin v. Agassiz [283 Mass. 358, 186 NE
659 (1933)] is still the law and state courts do not recognize any fiduciary duty of in-
siders to others trading in the market.
Ratner, supra note 78, at 955.
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nizes as sound-the duty to disclose or abstain. To attack the
existence of a duty to disclose given the fact of insider trading would,
in effect, have required the court to rewrite the entire line of cases
from Texas Gulf Sulphur to Shapiro. Fridrich, of course, does not do so.
But its failure to recognize and grapple with the fundamental principle
that underlies all those cases, and that is the express foundation for
Shapiro, leaves a holding which is, at best, an enigma. At worst, it
must be viewed as an outright rejection of the "disclose or abstain"
principle in the consideration of civil liability under rule l0b-5.
IV. THE CELEBREZZE CONCURRENCE: IMPOSING A RATIONAL
LIMITATION ON THE SCOPE OF
INSIDER TRADING LIABILITY
Recognizing the likely interpretation of the main opinion and the
dramatic impact which that holding would have on the scope of rule
lob-5 liability for damages in the open-market setting, Judge Cele-
brezze wrote a separate concurring opinion. He chose to strike a note
of moderation, declaring: "I do not read today's decision as a repudia-
tion of the 'disclose or abstain' rule in private damage actions. Rather,
I see the Court's opinion as imposing a rational limitation on the scope
of civil liability under rule lOb-5 for insiders trading in the open mar-
ket."
95
A "rational limitation" was no doubt uppermost in the collective
mind of the court from the outset of its consideration of Fridrich. But
the limitation imposed by the holding that some direct, causal relation-
ship must exist between an insider and outsider before civil liability
may be imposed under rule lOb-5 is not conducive to the continued
vitality of the "disclose or abstain" principle, which has at its heart an
affirmative duty to disclose once an insider trade occurs. Although he
did not expressly recognize the failure of the court's holding to con-
front this basic point, Judge Celebrezze cast the court's holding in the
following light:
In the present case, the Court holds that persons who trade on an
open market weeks after an insider has concluded his trading activity
must establish more than the materiality of the undisclosed information
to demonstrate that their losses were caused by defendants' trading.
As the Court notes, the 'disclose or abstain' rule is stated in the alter-
native. Trading is the gravamen of the offense. The public has no ab-
solute right to the undisclosed information. It is only ithen the insider
enters the market and creates an informational imbalance that a duty to
disclose is imposed to protect the anonymous investors trading with the
insider. . . .The duty of disclosure is owed to the class of investors
trading contemporaneously with the insider and it is only this group who
are the proper beneficiaries of the relaxed causation standard of Affili-
95. 542 F.2d at 323.
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ated Ute. These investors as a class are disadvantaged by the superior
knowledge of the insider. The stocks they traded generate the insiders'
profits.
9 6
The italicized portion of Judge Celebrezze's characterization rep-
resents the key element omitted from any consideration in the main
opinion. The recognition of a duty to disclose arising upon an insid-
er's trade, coupled with Judge Celebrezzes acknowledgment that the
breach of that duty to disclose will indeed support civil liability through
application of the "relaxed causation standard of Affiliated Ute"
to "contemporaneous" open-market buyers and sellers, bears little
resemblance to the main opinion. Indeed, it seems almost better
suited for a dissent from the main holding, for Judge Celebrezze
takes issue with Shapiro only in the manner in which the plaintifi
class is to be defined. He even notes that in the Shapiro circum-
stances the court may well have correctly defined the class of poten-
tial plaintiffs as including all traders in the market up to the time ol
effective disclosure.
This is more than subtle divergence from the problematic analy
sis of the main opinion in Fridrich. Indeed, the Celebrezze approad
leaves no doubt as to the Judge's unqualified endorsement of th:
fundamental Shapiro reasoning, as the following language boldi,
underscores:
[Ain insider should not escape civil liability for conduct which would
clearly violate rule lOb-5 in a face-to-face transaction, by the simple ex-
pedient of restricting his trading to the open market where the mechanics
of the marketplace make it difficult, if not impossible, to trace particu-
lar transactions.
It was fear of creating a loophole in the 'disclose or abstain' rule
which led the Second Circuit in Shapiro to reject the argument that the
rule should be restricted to SEC injunctive actions or to private suits
where the actual purchasers of the stock could be identified. . . . To
do so, the Court reasoned, would be to circumvent the strong policy con-
siderations supporting the rule and 'make a mockery' of an insider's
duty to disclose or abstain from trading. .. . Indeed, the 'disclose or
abstain' rule was devised to cope with the difficulty in tracing transac-
tions in an impersonal market. Since the mechanics of the marketplace
made it virtually impossible to identify the actual investors with whom
an insider is trading, the duty of disclosure is owned [sic] to investors
as a class who trade on the Market during the period of insider trading.
. . . The 'disclose or abstain' rule accomplishes two salutary purposes
of rule 10b-5: it insures the integrity of the marketplace and it compen-
sates for the inequity of trading with a corporate insider who has su-
perior access to material inside. information."3
96. Id. at 326 (emphasis added).
97. Id. at 327.
98. Id at 323-24 (emphasis added).
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Judge Celebrezze does, however, take issue with Shapiro over
the manner in which the class of eligible plaintiffs is to be defined.
Under his analysis, the duty to disclose "arises only when necessary
to equalize the information available to outside investors who are ac-
tively trading with an insider who is privy to undisclosed material
facts. When the insider ceases trading, the informational imbalance
ends and the market returns to its normal state."99 Thus, the only
plaintiffs who are owed a duty are those trading contemporaneously
with the insider. This conflicts with the analysis employed by Judge
Tenney in the second district court consideration in Shapiro, where
the class of plaintiffs was defined to be those traders who were in the
market from the date of the first inside trade by a defendant through
the date when public announcement of the information was made.
In the above passage from Fridrich, Judge Celebrezze rejects only
that aspect of Shapiro, urging instead that the informational imbal-
ance is corrected when insider trading ceases. He thus observes that
recovery in the Fridrich circumstances should be limited to those per-
sons who sold their shares in the market during the period in which
the insiders were actively purchasing. Since none of the plaintiffs fell
within that period, however, he joined in the reversal.
The two divergent opinions in Fridrich have spawned an obviously
difficult task of interpretation and application. The main opinion taken
alone is a harsh rejection of the fundamental principle that there can
be civil liability in open-market insider trading cases. Judge Cele-
brezze's concurrence, on the other hand, in careful and scholarly
fashion fully indorses the Shapiro extension of liability, subject only
to the narrowed scope of contemporafieous trading and the hope of
a realistic measure of damages.1'
The dilemma of Fridrich is that the separate concurrence is ap-
parently designed to ameliorate the impact of the main opinion, and
in so doing, prescribe what the case really stands for. Judge Cele-
brezze's characterization of the rule of law enunciated in Fridrich is
simple: "In the present case, the Court holds that persons who trade
on an open market weeks after an insider has concluded his trading
activity must establish more than the materiality of the undisclosed
information to demonstrate that their losses were caused by defen-
dants' trading."'1°  He viewed the paners decision as simply declaring
99. Id. at 327.
100. Defining the class to include all those who trade contemporaneously with the insider.
of course, still leaves the spectre of massive damage liability, but according to Judge Cele-
brezze, that prospect must remain until some realistic measure of damages is devised. This
question, he declared, "is better left to the remedy stage where a court can employ its equit-
able powers in shaping an award or until such time as the Congress chooses to act on this
problem." Id. at 326 n.ll. This is precisely the approach taken by the Second Circuit in
Shapiro.
101. Id. at 326.
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that one who breaches the "disclose or abstain" rule by trading in
the open market will not become a virtual insurer for losses sustained
by investors who happen to trade in that same stock well after the in-
sider trading has concluded. In all other respects, the legal and policy
analyses underlying the rule and its application in the open-market
setting are, under the Celebrezze approach, left intact.
Judge Celebrezze's characterization of the holding in Fridrich is
an inviting one, and his analysis is sound. But for the majority's effort
at policy justification for the outcome in Fridrich, one might agree with
Judge Celebrezze that reintroduction of a privity requirement was not
really intended by the court. Since it was clear that none of the
plaintiffs had traded contemporaneously with the insider-traders, the
Celebrezze position respecting the imposition of a simple contem-
poraneous trading limitation, coupled with the development of some
realistic measure of damages, might well have emerged as the rule
of the case, leaving courts and commentators to grapple with the
relative merits of the Second and Sixth Circuit positions. But the main
opinion does not support Judge Celebrezze's interpretation. Indeed,
rather than suggesting a "rational limitation" on the scope of civil
liability, the court challenges the very proposition that there should
be recovery at all. The Celebrezze characterization of the Fridrich
holding is in fact only a characterization of the result, for the real
holding is that the act of insider trading must be causally connected
with the losses of open-market plaintiffs, and that sufficient causal
connection means something tantamount to a direct or traditional
privity relationship.
There is evident in the Celebrezze concurring opinion an effort
to extend the main opinion and its reasoning into a correct and con-
sistent rule lOb-5 legal framework and thus preserve the viability of
that framework in the circuit. Judge Celebrezze characterizes the
class of contemporaneous open-market purchasers, who should be
permitted recovery on the basis of the related Affiliated Ute causation
analysis, as "surrogate plaintiffs" for those investors who do have the
kind of direct relationship of which Judge Engle speaks.'0 2 Because
mechanics of the market make the establishment of this relationship
impossible, the entire class of contemporaneous traders takes the
place of those individuals who, but for the open-market setting, would
satisfy the strict causation requirement. Although Judge Celebrczze
recognized that the class would include investors who were in no way
involved with insider transactions except for their time of trading, he
declared that in order "to accomplish the deterrent and compensatory
purposes of lOb-5, it is better to be overinclusive in the definition of
the plaintiff class than underinclusive." 10 3 Thus, by explication the
102. Id. at326 nll.
103. Id.
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essential point of the main opinion is shaped to fit well into current
lOb-5 analysis.
With deference and respect to Judge Celebrezze's attempt to
supply substance to a deficient main opinion, the situation calls to
mind the proverbial counsel concerning attempts to fashion a silk
purse from the sow's ear. The essence of the Celebrezze analysis,
derived from precedent from Texas Gulf Sulphur to Shapiro, is that
there is a class of open-market traders for whom a relaxed causation
principle is available. That, of course, is unqualifiedly rejected in
the main opinion, and under it, there is no adequate substitute for a
direct causal relationship.
Since the same result obtains in Fridrich regardless of whether
the Engle or Celebrezze analysis is employed, the question arises as
to which view of the case will emerge predominant, and corollary to
that, which should be followed. One indication of the answer to the
first question is already available. In the first application of Fridrich
at the district court level, Judge Thomas of the Northern District of
Ohio, declared, in Imperial Supply Co. v. Northern Ohio Bank:'°"
Tested by Fridrich, the critical question that must be considered in
asessing whether the complaint states a cause of action is whether it is
adequately alleged that plaintiffs were 'influenced in their trading deci-
sions by any act of the defendants.' . . . It is not alleged that the act of
selling [Northern Ohio Bank] stock by [alleged inside trading] defendants,
albeit with inside information, influenced the plaintiffs in their trading
decisions.'05
With this finding Judge Thomas dismissed from a multi-count class
action complaint a count alleging that certain defendants sold shares
on inside information over a substantial period of timi. Plaintiffs,
open-market purchasers, had relied directly on Shapiro to support the
count, alleging that material facts on which insiders traded, if dis-
closed, "would have had a substantial effect on the market price of the
common shares" 1 0 6 of the bank defendant. Plaintiffs contended that
defendants' trading gave rise to a duty to disclose, which was breached.
But the court concluded "[t]he allegations of count III [the insider
trading count] do not allege any nexus between plaintiffs' purchases
and the sale of stock by any of the count III defendants."
0 7
104. [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L RE.P. (CCH) 95.908 (N.D. Ohio 1976).
105. Id. at 91,403.
106. Im at91,402.
107. Id. Judge Thomas' analysis does contain within it, however, a perplexing ambiguity.
After holding that no sufficient causal connection was alleged in the insider trading count, he
made this observation:
Moreover, under Fridrich, if the acts alleged to form the basis of defendants' lia-
bility consist of misrepresentation or omissions, to establish an implied right of zuction
against an inside trader there must either exist a duty for the insider to reveal the ihfor-
mation involved, as in Affiliated Ut(e Citizens v. United States ... or the insidqr if
not required to disclose the inside information, would only be liable to a purchaser or
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Although the court made reference to Judge Celebrezze's con-
curring opinion in Fridrich in a footnote, Northern Ohio Bank is a
strict application of the main Fridrich opinion. The factual pattern
and allegations in Northern Ohio Bank gave Judge Thomas the clear
option of relying upon either Fridrich opinion for his ultimate con-
clusion. Trading in the shares of the bank apparently spanned some
four years or more; there was no limiting allegation concerning who
among the plaintiff class should be permitted to recover for alleged
insider trading at specified times during that period of time, and there
was no contemporaneous trading allegation. Just as Judge Cele-
brezze found that the Fridrich plaintiffs could not recover for lack of
contemporaneous trading, Judge Thomas, employing the same ra-
tionale, could have restricted any claim in Northern Ohio Bank and
indeed dismissdd the claim before him without impairing the con-
tinuing vitality of the "disclose or abstain" rule.
Since both Sixth Circuit approaches restrict the scope of rule
lOb-5 liability as enunciated in the Shapiro trilogy of decisions, it
could be argued that Fridrich should not be followed at all. This
writer, however, urges that Fridrich should indeed be followed, to the
extent that it imposes a contemporaneous trading limitation on the
scope of rule lOb-5 liability for insider trading in the open market
setting. That is to say that the rationale and rule expressed in the
Celebrezze concurrence should be adopted and applied as a rational
limitation on otherwise potentially limitless liability. Judge Cele-
brezze's premise, as noted earlier, is simply that an insider who
breaches the Texas Gulf Sulphur "disclose or abstain" rule should
not become the virtual insurer for losses sustained by those who
happen to be trading in the open market weeks after insider trading
activity has ceased, as was the case in Fridrich. But recognition of
the basic principle that the "disclose or abstain" rule does indeed
create a duty owed to open-market investors as a class underscores
the dilemma faced by those who must determine the scope of the
civil accountability that it spawns.
There is, as Judge Celebrezze points out, a need to restrict the
scope of rule lOb-5 civil liability for insider trading in the open-market
setting. The imposition of massive civil liability which is, in every
sense of the word, disproportionate to the extent of an insider's trading
seller of stock in the open market if the insider nonetheless released misleading infor-
mation. Id. at 91.403.
The meaning of this statement by the court is not entirely clear. Under the 'disclose
or abstain" rule of Texas Gulf Sulphur, a duty to disclose material information arises with an
insider trade. The problem is then connecting that duty, or the breach of it. to open-markct
trading-a connection that Affiiated Uie arguably supplies. It would seem. then. that if Judge
Thomas recognized the -disclose or abstain" rule as establishing a duty, then liability could be
imposed. This, however, is inconsistent with the finding by the court that no requisite "ne.xus
was alleged. The author suggests that this paragraph of Judge Thomas Northern Ohfo Bank
opinion will engender continuing debate.
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activities, serves no useful compensatory purpose unless it can be
linked to an actual market imbalance, a disadvantage to outside
traders, which is brought on by the wrongful conduct. The admoni-
tion of the main opinion in Fridrich that investors must be prepared
to accept the risk of trading in an open market without complete or
always accurate information is valid, so far as it goes. But the fact
is that rule lOb-5 now insures that the risk of trading without ma-
terial information is qualified by the fact that all investors in that
market face the identical risk. Before and after an insider trade,
open-market traders may have access to the same information. But
the use of undisclosed material information upsets the balance and
counters the reasonable expectations of investors, and thus infects
every other contemporaneous transaction. Thereafter, the balance
returns and the market, although tainted by the prior unlawful activity,
is fair again.
It is for this reason that a contemporaneous trading limitation
on the scope of rule lOb-5 insider trading liability is a sound and
rational one. In Shapiro Judge Tenney viewed the impact of a breach
of the duty of disclosure as extending beyond the period of insider
trading and continuing until disclosure is made, theorizing that an
informational imbalance exists until it is affirmatively corrected. But
the act of trading without disclosing material information can have
an identifiable impact only upon those who trade in the same market
within the same time parameters. It should not extend until the mo-
ment of disclosure is reached-a moment which could be days, weeks,
or even months removed from insider trading activity. Insider trading
does not, in the sense of the dissemination of false information, for
example, alter the total mix of information until corrected. Rather,
the alteration exists only within the time that insider trading destroys
market integrity by creating unfair advantage. That is the thrust of
the "disclose or abstain" rule-to preserve a constancy of market
integrity. 08
A contemporaneous trading restriction is consonant with the
basic recognition that breach of the duty of disclosure owed by an
insider-trader to the marketplace as a whole can and does result in
108. Professor-Stuart Goldberg succinctly characterized this function as follows.
The disclosure provisions of the federal securities acts can never protect a private
investor from himself. They are not intended to do so. The sucker who has been given
an "even break" remains a sucker; but at least he has been given the opportunity to
exercise the evaluative capacity which he is presumed to possess. It is this opportu-
nity which the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws seek to guarantee.
S. GOLDBERG, SEC TRADING RESTRicTioNs AND REPORTING REQUIR-EIENTs roR INISDMes
42-43 (1973). Edward Brodsky adds this valuable insight:
The securities laws are designed to make all material information about public com-
panies available to all investors. What the outsider doesn't know hurts him-it may
devastate him-because if he knew the adverse facts he wouldn't buy and wouldn't
suffer what may be a substantial loss when the news becomes public.
E. BRODSKY, GUIDE TO SECURITIES LITIGATION 101 (1974).
1977]
OHIO STATE LA I JOURNAL
measurable damages that are neither imaginary nor speculative. Buy
ers and sellers in the open market have the right to expect that thl
market in which they participate is a fair one, untainted and unim
paired by the presence of transactions based upon undisclosed materia
information. Market integrity is based upon all investors havini
equal knowledge on which to base investment decisions. Whethe
all investors are capable of acquiring or utilizing the informatio
available to the market in general or whether they use it at all in mak
ing investment decisions is not important. It is only important that i
be available to all. This was the concern that gave birth to thl
"disclose or abstain" rule in Texas Gulf Sulphur-a rule that insure
the integrity of the marketplace and compensates for inequity of trad
ing with those who have superior access to material inside informa
tion.109
The opinion by Judge Engle in Fridrich, however, ignores thi
inequity by precluding any private recovery for insider trading througl
the imposition of a causation limitation that is virtually unworkable ii
an open-market setting. Such a result is unacceptable and should b
rejected as an overreaction by the majority of the panel to what i
deemed to be an intolerable Shapiro result. The class definition ii
Shapiro-the determination of who may recover-is not without it
problems. Indeed, as the foregoing discussion highlights, Judg
Tenney's view in Shapiro of the extent of the market impact, of th
"informational balance," wrought by insider trading should be chal
lenged as being too far removed from the precipitative act. But tha
challenge as to who should recover surely does not and cannot man
date a determination that no one should recover as a matter of lam
Rather, it merely calls for the kind of rational limitation Judge Celc
brezze has proffered.
V. CONCLUSION
In the final analysis conclusions as to the wisdom or aberrant
of the Sixth Circuit in Fridrich will depend upon the purpose that i
ultimately attributed to section 10(b) and rule lOb-5. In the conte?
of insider trading in the open-market setting, if it is determined th-
rule lOb-5 is, or should be, concerned only with imposing sanctior
109. Judge Waterman's expression in Texas Gulf Sulphur of the "core" of rule l0b
should not be forgotten:
The core of Rule lOb-5 is the implementation of the Congressional purpose that all
investors should have equal access to the rewards of participation in securities transac-
tions. It was the intent of Congress that all members of the investing public should
be subject to identical market risks,-which market risks include, of course the risk that
one's evaluative capacity or one's capital available to put at risk may exceed anothers
capacity or capital . . . [WInequities based upon unequal access to knowledge should
not be shrugged off as inevitable in our way of life, or, in view of the congressional
concern in the area, remain uncorrected.
401 F.2d at 851-52.
[Vol. 38:6,
INSIDER TRADING LIABILITY
against persons who engage in such trading and thus deter the prac-
tice, then the objection of Professor Ratner-that the imposition of
damages having nothing to do with "imaginary losses" suffered by
open-market traders and unrelated to profits realized by defendants
is unrealistiel°-is correct. But, on the other hand, if the private right
of action under the rule continues to be viewed not merely as a basis
for sanction, but also as a device for compensating those harmed by
the unlawful conduct, then it cannot be said that the recognition of a
broad private remedy based upon the duty owed by an inside trader
to open-market buyers and sellers is either inappropriate or unjust.
While the Fridrich court overtly endorsed the view that the rule
lOb-5 private action is compensatory in nature,' its policy rationale
for denying recovery clearly supports a much more restrictive deter-
rence objective. The court attempts a balancing act in which it strives
not to upset accepted notions but at the same time to reject them in
application. -Tie expressed desire of the court to restrict the scope
of rule lOb-5 civil liability in the insider-trading context is consistent
in result with that court's recent pronouncements on other more
generalized aspects of rule lOb-5 claims." 2  But this drive of the
court to assume a cohesive conservative stance in rule lOb-5 litiga-
tions fails in the Fridrich main opinion for want of a realistic approach
to the genuine problem of the extent of insider-trading liability in an
open-market setting.
In reasoned and consistent analyses from Texas Gulf Sulphur to
Shapiro, the judiciary has enunciated a rule that recognizes the im-
portance of compensating for genuine harm done to the fairness and
integrity of the marketplace as a whole and those participating in it
without the benefit of an insider's knowledge. It is based upon a
basic duty of disclosure that arises in the face of insider trading and
which compels equalization of information among all of those par-
ticipants.
The extension of the scope of liability under the "disclose or
abstain" rule and its concomitant duty to the degree represented by
Shapiro is, in this writer's considered judgment, unwarranted. At
the same time, however, its rejection in Fridrich is wholly unacceptable
both as a matter of law and policy. The foundation for rule lOb-5
civil liability in the open-market setting, as cemented in Shapiro, is
sound. Reasonably applied, it leads to results that are just and con-
110. See Ratner, supra note 78, at 956.
111. 542F.2dat321.
112. See, e.g., Marsh v. Armada Corp., 533 F.2d 978 (6th Cir. 1976) (standing and sub-
stantive fraud); Chelsea Assocs. v. Rapanos, 527 F.2d 1266 (6th Cir. 1975) (reliance)- SEC v.
Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304 (6th Cir. 1974) (rule lOb-5 secondary liability). &t see Nickels v. Kochler
Management Corp., 541 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1976) (general fraud stitute of limitations applied);
Spoon v. Walston & Company, Inc., 478 F.2d 246 (6th Cir. 1973) (private cause of action for
violation of Exchange Act margin restrictions).
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form to the dominant purpose attributed to section 10(b) and rule lOb-5
throughout their history.
The fear of "Draconian" liability cannot now support the majority
rationale in Fridrich. Indeed, to do so is to say in substance that no
person may recover because a few too many may recover. The desire
to fashion a rational limitation on the scope of open-market liability
is needed and welcome, but a limitation that effectively extinguishes
private recovery is neither rational nor desirable. In an effort to
limit a remedy the majority of the panel instead crumbled the legal
foundation for the claim. Judge Celebrezze recognized this, and his
concurring opinion represents an effort to channel the impact of the
main opinion away from adverse liability analysis and instead to the
establishment of a limitation on potential recovery.
There is, in this instance along with many others, a fine line be-
tween the legal substance of a claim and determining that some in-
dividuals are not within the class of persons who may recover, for
indeed as to that group not within the class there is no claim. But
the line does exist. A legally cognizable claim does not lose its
character as such because a particular class of plaintiffs is deemed to
have no remedy under it. Whether the extent of the damage recovery
permitted in Shapiro was right or wrong, or whether it is ultimately
upheld or not, the recognition as a matter of law that there does exist
a class of open-market investors having no direct privity relationship
with an inside trader who suffers injury caused by inside trading re-
mains intact. Not so, however, in Fridrich if the main opinion is to
emerge as the rule of the case. For in Fridrich the essence of legal
liability, the "disclose or abstain" rule and the duty it creates, is cast
aside in the rush to limit a remedy.
It is the Celebrezze opinion in Fridrich which properly recognizes
the established legal foundation for damage liability for insider trad-
ing in the open market setting. And it is that opinion which proffers
the needed rational limitation on recovery and which should emerge
not only as the Sixth Circuit position but the rule of law throughout
all of the circuits. Let there be a rational limitation on recovery in
the form of a contemporaneous trading requirement, and at the same
time, let there continue the vitality of fundamental rule lOb-5 protec-
tion of the markets through the "disclose or abstain" rule. To do less
can only amount to the rejection of a time-honored principle of federal
securities regulation that securities markets shall be free and honest.
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